By the middle of the 2000s an electoral authoritarian regime had been established under Putin, and the Kremlin's "party of power", United Russia (UR) had emerged as the dominant party. Based on the results of Duma and Presidential elections over the period [2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009][2010][2011][2012][2013][2014][2015][2016], this article examines cross-regional variation in static and dynamic nationalization of voting for UR. The main finding is that in the overwhelming majority of Russian regions, a high level of static nationalisation is accompanied by a high level of dynamic nationalization. In most of the regions, voting for UR rises or falls in a consistent manner across the elections. Some of the regions consistently vote in favour of UR whilst another group of regions consistently provides UR with poorer results than the national average. Finally, there are some regions which consistently vote very close to the national results, reflecting the national trends in voting for UR to the greatest degree. Cross-regional variations in both static and dynamic nationalization of UR's support are mostly explained by the degree of authoritarianism in Russian regions.
where the vote share of each party is similar across geographic units (e.g. districts, provinces, and regions), while weakly nationalised party systems exhibit large variation in the vote shares of parties across sub-national units' (Kasuya and Moenius, 2008, p. 136) .
Previous studies of party institutionalisation in Russia (Golosov 2015 , Turovsky 2016 have shown that although cross-regional differences in voting for UR are salient, the party system became much more nationalised in the 2000s. This is primarily due to the fact that by the mid-2000s the Kremlin's party of power, United Russia (UR), had emerged as the dominant force in the country (see Gel'man 2006 , Reuter 2010 , Reuter and Remington 2009 , Ross 2011 .
Under Putin, a "power vertical" was created which has enabled the Kremlin to bring the main elite groups under its control, and an electoral authoritarian regime (Golosov 2011 , Kynev 2017 , Ross 2011a , Schedler 2002 has been established which has guarantees the victory of UR in almost all elections.
At the same time, it has to be stressed that there are two dimensions of party nationalisation (see Morgenstern, Swindle, and Castagnola, 2009, Mustillo, and Mustillo, 2012) ; "static nationalisation," and "dynamic nationalisation." 'Static nationalisation measures the consistency of a party's support across a country at a particular point in time. It therefore measures the degree to which a party has broad appeal across the nation.' (Morgenstern et al, 2009 ). "Dynamic nationalisation", by contrast, 'is concerned with whether a party's vote in the various districts rises or falls in a consistent manner across elections' and here the stress 'is on the uniformity of ''swings'' or ''trends'' in the district vote' (Ibid.).
Whilst static nationalization of the voting for UR has been examined by scholars, the study of dynamic nationalization has not yet been addressed. In this study, we shall focus on both dimension and particularly on the "dynamic" aspect of party nationalisation. The paper addresses the following questions: To what extent is static nationalization accompanied by dynamic nationalization? Are there cross-regional variations in the dynamic nationalization of UR's support, and if so what explains these differences? Which regions demonstrate stable levels of deviations at each election, and which regions demonstrate variations in their levels of deviation? Are there differences in the stability of regional deviations between Duma and Presidential elections?
In order to answer these questions we analyse the four Duma elections (2003, 2007, 2011 and 2016) , and the three Presidential elections (2004, 2008, 2012) contested by UR, since the party was formed in 2001. The study begins with a brief review of cross-regional differences in voting for UR / UR candidates. We examine the scope of cross-regional differences and compare the dynamic of the deviations from the national results across the regions. Next, we juxtapose the degree and stability of regional deviations in UR's electoral support from the national results. This allows us to divide all the regions into discrete groups, which are analysed in detail in the final section.
Static Nationalisation: The Scope of Cross-Regional Differences in Voting for UR in

Duma and Presidential Elections
Russia is one of the largest and most ethnically diverse multinational federations in the world.
Moreover, the Federation is highly asymmetrical. The current 85 federal subjects vary widely in the size of their territories and populations, and their socio-economic status and ethnic composition (Ross, 2011) . The regional dimension of voting for United Russia has been examined by many scholars (Clem 2006; Marsh, Albert and Warhola 2004; Reisinger and Moraski 2009; Reisinger and Moraski 2010 , Panov and Ross 2013 White 2015 White 2016) .
There are also important regional variations in electoral and party politics and in the types of political regimes which operate in the regions, which range from "competitive" to "hegemonic" authoritarian (Panov and Ross 2013) . As this study will demonstrate, the dominance of UR at the national level is accompanied by strong cross-regional variations. Thus, despite the fact that UR / UR's candidates consistently gain a majority in all the regions, the degree of its dominance varies greatly. In other word, one can observe significant regional deviations from UR's nationwide results, in both positive and negative directions.
A review of the most recent literature on regional voting in Russia, demonstrates that regions with a larger share of non-Russians and a larger share of rural inhabitants exhibit higher levels of support for UR (Panov and Ross 2016; Frye, Reuter and Szakonyi 201; Golosov 2013; White 2016) . Thus, for example, White in her study of the impact of ethnicity and voting for UR has demonstrated that districts with greater proportions of non-Russians were 'robust sources of support' for United Russia in the Duma elections of 2003-2011. The ethnic republics delivered 'between one-quarter and roughly one-third of United Russia's votes in each election:
26.8% in 2003 , 25.4% in 2007 , and 30.3% percent in 2011 ' (White 2015 . Likewise, Reisinger and Moraski found that the strongest explanatory factor for variations in the level of electoral support for UR (in Duma and Presidential elections held over the period [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] was, 'the proportion of the population that is non-Russian, and they concluded that, 'to a high degree the federal leadership's dominance rests on vote totals provided by the republics and autonomous regions ' (2010, 68) .
In order to examine static nationalisation, i.e. regional deviations from the national results for UR in separate elections in more detail, we use two sets of data: 1) The regional party list results for UR in four Duma elections (2003, 2007, 2011 and 2016) [ Table 1 about here]
[ Figure 1 about here]
In general, one can see (in Table 1 ) that the range of regional results for UR / UR's candidates was exceptionally high in all the elections, although it was higher in the Duma elections (from 50.6% to 70.4%) than in the Presidential elections (between 32.3% and 53%). Table 2. [ Table 2 In other words, they deliver much higher levels of electoral support to UR than the Russian electorate as a whole. The results, which are presented in Table 3 , demonstrate that the only statistically significant predictor is regime-type (which refers to the level of authoritarianism, see discussion below)
[ Table 3 about here]
The results of our regression analysis is also confirmed by the picture on Figure -Chukotka). Again, we can see that all of the regions with the highest levels of deviation have positive deviations: these are the well-known 'national republics' with strong authoritarian political regimes. In other words, in most cases it is strong regional authoritarianism that generates the highest levels of regional deviations in voting for UR / UR's candidates.
Dynamic Nationalisation: Stability/Instability of Regional Deviations in Voting for UR in
Duma and Presidential Elections
It has to be stressed that the indicator averURdev shows the extent to which a region generally deviates from the national value, however it tells us nothing about the stability/instability of these deviations, as in order to calculate this indicator we take a modulus of deviations. Thus, for example, the same high value of averURdev may appear both in the case of high and very stable deviations in one direction and in the case of very unstable deviations, when a region [ Figure 3 about here]
In general, as can be seen in Figure 3 , most regions demonstrate fairly high levels of stability of deviations. Both vertical and horizontal lines divide the plane into sections according to the value 0.08. The value was chosen rather arbitrary, however it is likely to be not very high, and consequently may logically be considered as a conditional threshold. Hence, the overwhelming majority of the regions (60 out of 83), which are located on the lower left section, have values of average instability lower than 0.08 for both types of election. Only three regions (11 -Chechnya; 25 -Karachaevo-Cherkessiya; 43 -Moscow) have values of average instability higher than 0.08 for both types of election.
Interconnection between the Degree and Stability of Regional Deviations of UR's Support
We can divide the regions into various groups based on the degree of their deviations (both stable and unstable) from the national results. If we take the same threshold as previously, it is possible to distinguish regions with 'normal' or 'moderate' deviations (less than 0.15) and 'anomalous' or 'abnormal' deviation (more than 0.15). Also we have to take into account the fact that deviations may have a different sign, i.e., be either in favour of UR or against UR.
Additionally, 'fluctuating deviations' when there are neither clear pro nor contra UR trends, have to be distinguished. Groups of regions based on these criteria are displayed in Table 4 .
[ Table 4 Nevertheless, in the context of Russian regional politics such a connection appears. The anomalous voting for UR in the most authoritarian regions is grounded in the strong administrative pressure which is placed on voters and electoral commissions. To the extent which authoritarian rulers exercise strict control over their regional elites, voters, and the electoral process in general, the results for UR and its candidates will not depend on voters' preferences. As a consequence, high instability of deviations in UR's support from the national results takes place in these regions. Softer regional regimes are characterized by greater degrees of intra-elite competitiveness that leads to weaker administrative pressure. In this context, the results of UR and its candidates will depend on voters' preferences to a much greater extent.
Here, national election trends matter and thus the level of instability of deviations decreases.
2. Moving to the right sector below the horizontal line, we can distinguish some groups of regions with normal unstable deviations in voting for UR -12 in the Duma elections (excluding number 7 -Bashkortostan which was included in the first cluster) and 8 -in the Presidential elections (including Tambov (67) that is very closed to the line). Only two regions (Moscow and Tambov) are common for both Duma and Presidential elections, however we suggest that high instability of deviations of at least one type of election is sufficient for inclusion of the region in this cluster.
Most of these regions (11 of 18), as we would expect, are characterized by fluctuated voting. In other words, they deviate from the national results in favour of UR at some elections, whilst at others they deviate in the opposite direction. At the same time, there is a group of 5 regions which demonstrate completely or almost completely contra-UR unstable deviations: (14), Kursk (37), Ulyanovsk (75), Kurgan (36), and Kaluga (23) deviate from the nationwide results in all the elections against UR, but the degree of their deviation is not very high, thus they can be considered as regions which reflect the national trends rather than opposing UR.
Conclusion
The main finding of this study is that static nationalization of UR's support, which takes place in the context of Putin's power vertical, is also accompanied by dynamic nationalization. As At the same time, there still remain important regional variations in both static and dynamic nationalization of voting for UR. The analysis shows that these variations are mostly explained by the type of authoritarian rule which exists in a particular region. While in some 'competitive authoritarian' regions, genuine competition between political actors is allowed to take place, as long as the election results deliver overall victory to the ruling party, in other 'hegemonic authoritarian regions', genuine electoral competition is eliminated completely and election results are manipulated in favour of UR. Our study uncovered a group of 11 'hegemonic authoritarian' regimes (Chechnya, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, KabardinoBalkariya, Tuva, Dagestan, Ingushetiya, Mordoviya, Kemerovo, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Yamalo-Nenets AO) where there is no genuine political competition. In these regions we find abnormally high levels of support for UR. By exercising strong administrative pressure on voters and electoral commissions, the rulers of these regions are able to guarantee the Kremlin almost any election result it desires. As a consequence, change in the political context plays almost no part in determining the election results for the regions in the hegemonic authoritarian group. They do not follow the national trend of support for UR, which explains why these regions have the highest levels of deviation, as well as the highest levels of instability of these deviations.
The study also found that whilst the general scope of cross-regional deviations is fairly stable for each type of election, at the same time, there are important differences between Duma and Presidential elections. Presidential elections are much more personalized, and Putin's personal popularity matters to a greater extent than in Duma elections. As a result, UR's candidates are much more successful than their party in Duma elections. Thus, Presidential elections are characterized by a lower range of regional variations in their results for UR, a lower average degree of deviations, and higher stability of deviations of individual regions, from the nationwide results.
Finally, our results challenges some of the prevailing views about the nature of centrallocal relations in Russia and Putin's power vertical -the idea that the President is omnipotent and the Kremlin can guarantee any election result it requires from any region. Dynamic nationalisation primarily means that there is a consistent pattern of support across election cycles, but it does not signify what the level of support will be. Our study shows that whilst a majority of regions give strong levels of support to Putin and UR there are also group of regions which consistently give lower than average votes to the Kremlin. Thus, geography and the specific nature of regional politics matters. The centre cannot simply dictate to the regions how they should vote. Moreover, to achieve victory in the Duma and Presidential elections, the Kremlin has to rely on the 'inflated' and largely 'manufactured' electoral support it receives from the ethnic republics. Regiony Rossii: Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie Pokazateli 2010 (Moskva: Rosstat, 2010 . Table 3 .3; Regiony Rossii: Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie Pokazateli 2016 (Moskva: Rosstat, 2016 . 
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